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Criminal Law-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-AN EXAMINATION OF SEN-
TENCING IN FLORIDA FOR THE UNDERLYING FELONY IN A FELONY
MURDER CASE AFTER Whalen v. United States-State v. Pinder,
375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979).
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits
both successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the
same offense.1 A threshold question for all double jeopardy analy-
sis therefore is: what constitutes the same offense?2 In State v.
Pinder,' the Florida Supreme Court answered that question, decid-
ing that a felony murder and the underlying felony are the same
offense.
Pinder, charged with first degree murder, sexual battery, and
burglary, was convicted and sentenced for each offense in a single
trial.4 The jury found Pinder guilty of first degree murder under a
felony murder theory.' Pinder appealed, alleging violation of his
1. The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution provides: "[No person
shall) be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The clause was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Florida also has a double jeopardy
clause in its constitution which reads: "No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. . . ." FLA. CoNs'r. art. I, § 9. The three primary purposes of the double jeop-
ardy clause have been determined as: "First, it protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after an acquittal. Second, it protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after a conviction. Third, it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense." Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 (1980) (citing North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) and Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)).
2. See Comment, Double Jeopardy-Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L. REv. 87
(1971) and Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965) for thorough discussions
of the various tests for determining what constitutes the "same offense."
3. 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979).
4. Pinder v. State, 366 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla.
1979). The trial court sentenced Pinder to life imprisonment for the first degree murder, 30
years for the burglary, and 30 years for the sexual battery. While reversing the conviction
and sentence for the burglary, the district court of appeal noted that the 30-year sentence
for the burglary conviction was excessive. Since there was no allegation that Pinder was
armed or committed an assault during the burglary, he was charged with a second degree
felony which has a maximum prison term of 15 years. Id. at 39 n.1. See Fla. Stat. §
775.0 8 2 (3)(c) (1979).
5. The felony murder doctrine is a legal fiction which allows the state to prosecute a
defendant for homicide without proof that the act was done with the normally required
malice aforethought. The policy justification for this constructive malice device is that it is
foreseeable that accidental or negligent homicides might occur during the commission of
some felonies. It is assumed therefore, that a defendant who commits these felonies has
evidenced sufficient malice aforethought to be held liable for murder. Critics of the felony
murder rule question the nexus between the felon's implied malice and the homicide. The
criticism has led some jurisdictions to limit the applicability of the rule. The country which
promulgated the rule, England, has abolished it. See generally Perkins, A Re-Examination
of Malice Aforethought, 43 YmAL L.J. 537 (1934); Comment, Constitutional Limitations
Upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss.
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fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. He argued
that he should not have been convicted and sentenced both for the
underlying felony and the felony murder itself.6 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal agreed with Pinder's arguments because the
"proof of the underlying felony is, of course, indispensable to the
murder conviction."' 7 The district court then vacated Pinder's con-
viction and sentence for burglary.8 The Florida Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning of the district court and affirmed its
decision.9
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that both the district
and the supreme court should have vacated Pinder's conviction
under a lesser included offense analysis. As indicated in Whalen v.
United States,10 a recent Supreme Court decision, the Florida
courts improperly relied upon other United States Supreme Court
cases to hold that sentencing for both a felony murder and the un-
derlying felony violates the protection of the double jeopardy
clause. Before suggesting the proper basis of the Pinder decision,
especially in view of Whalen, the reasoning of the district and the
supreme court will be explained.
The Florida Supreme Court expressly approved the holding and
rationale of the Second District Court of Appeal."' The district
court in turn had based its decision on a progression of Supreme
Court "same offense" decisions that began in 1932 with Block-
burger v. United States"' in which the Court held: "The applicable
rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."Is
L. REv. 1021 (1975); Comment, Felony Murder-Happy Hunting Ground of Prosecutors, 21
U. MiAm L.Q. 457 (1966); V. Reber, Felony Murder: The Rule, Its Relation to the Under-
lying Criminal Act, and Liability of One Who Does Not Perpetrate the Homicidal Act
(August 4, 1977) (unpublished manuscript on file at the University of Florida Spessard Hol-
land Law Center).
6. Pinder v. State, 366 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 375 So. 2d 836
(Fla. 1979).
7. Id. at 40.
8. Id. at 42. The court vacated Pinder's conviction and sentence for the second degree
burglary rather than the rape since the burglary was the less serious offense. Id.
9. 375 So. 2d at 837.
10. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980).
11. 375 So. 2d at 837.
12. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The defendant was charged with violating provisions of a nar-
cotics act by selling morphine to one person on different days. He was also charged with
selling differing amounts of the drug from different packages. Id. at 301.
13. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
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Forty-five years later, Brown v. Ohio1 4 extended Blockburger by
holding that statutory crimes need not be identical in constituent
elements or in proof to be considered the same for double jeopardy
purposes.1 '
The defendant in Brown was first convicted of joyriding, and
then of stealing the same car." The Ohio Court of Appeals cor-
rectly held that the misdemeanor of joyriding was a lesser included
offense within the felony of auto theft, but it nevertheless affirmed
the defendant's two convictions because they were directed at dif-
ferent points of his lengthy joyride. 7 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the second conviction, ruling that the defendant's
fifth amendment rights had been violated.18
Although Brown was first convicted of the lesser offense of joy-
riding before being tried and convicted for auto theft, the Court
ruled that this sequence was immaterial. The Court stated that,
"Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids
successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater
and lesser included offense.""' It is apparent that neither the fortu-
ity of the state's first obtaining the conviction for the lesser in-
cluded offense, nor the division of a crime into distinct units, can
operate to nullify the protections of the double jeopardy clause.
Even though proof of auto theft requires proof of intent, and joy-
riding does not, the Court ruled that both offenses were the
"same" for purposes of double jeopardy.' 0
While the Blockburger test was first used to determine when the
violation of two statutes constituted the "same offense" in cumula-
tive sentence cases,"1 the Brown Court applied Blockburger to a
14. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
15. Id. at 164.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 164. The defendant's use of the car spanned nine days. Id. at 162.
18. Id. at 170. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the result might have been differ-
ent "if the Ohio legislature had provided that joyriding is a separate offense for each day in
which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent." Id. at 169 n.8.
19. 432 U.S. at 169 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 168. The Court stated:
This conclusion merely restates what has been this Court's understanding of the
Double Jeopardy Clause at least since In re Nielsen was decided in 1889. In that
case the Court endorsed the rule that "where ... a person has been tried and
convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a
second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy
for the same offence."
Id. (quoting In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889)).
21. 432 U.S. at 166.
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multiple prosecution case. 2 The Court stated: "Where the judge is
forbidden to impose cumulative punishment for two crimes at the
end of a single proceeding, the prosecutor is forbidden to strive for
the same result in successive proceedings." s Thus, defendants are
afforded double jeopardy protection against both cumulative
sentences and multiple prosecutions.
Shortly after deciding Brown, the Court went one step further in
broadening the "same offense" rule when it applied a lesser in-
cluded offense analysis to a felony murder case, Harris v.
Oklahoma,24 which also involved successive prosecutions. The de-
fendant was first convicted of felony murder. At a later trial, he
was convicted of robbery with firearms, the felony upon which his
murder conviction was based.26 The Harris Court concluded that
where conviction of the greater crime cannot be had without con-
viction of the lesser crime, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars pros-
ecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one. 2 6
As a result, double jeopardy protection was extended to preclude
prosecution for a lesser included offense after defendants have
been convicted of the greater crime.
The Florida Supreme Court and the district court relied upon
the Brown and Harris cases for the Pinder ruling. 7 That reliance,
however, is misplaced. The issue in Brown and Harris was whether
successive prosecutions are prohibited by the double jeopardy
clause2 and not, as in Pinder, whether concepts of double jeopardy
prohibit cumulative punishments .2 The Florida courts should have
begun their analysis by referring to Blockburger.
The error of the Florida courts is understandable. Blockburger
was not even cited in Florida case law until 1978.0 Prior to that
time, Florida judicially created its own version of the Blockburger
22. Id. at 168. The Brown Court noted that Blockburger is not the only standard for
deciding when "successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense." Id. at 166
n.6. The other test which can be applied to bar successive prosecutions is "where the second
prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first." Id. The
Court explained that applying the Blockburger test meant that it need not decide whether
Brown qualified for the additional repetition of proof standard. Id.
23. Id. at 166.
24. 433 U.S. 682 (1977). Brown was decided on June 16, 1977. Harris was decided less
than two weeks later on June 29, 1977.
25. Id. at 682-83.
26. Id. at 682 (footnote omitted).
27. 375 So. 2d at 837; 366 So. 2d at 40.
28. 432 U.S. at 162; 433 U.S. at 682.
29. 375 So. 2d at 837.
30. Ennis v. State, 364 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1978).
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test, the single transaction rule, to protect defendants from double
jeopardy violations in multiple sentence cases. 1 The single trans-
action rule created conflicting opinions and results,32 which eventu-
ally prompted the legislature to enact a statute to protect defend-
ants from being punished separately for lesser included offenses.83
The statute reads:
Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode,
commits an act or acts constituting a violation of two or more
criminal statutes, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall
be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding lesser
included offenses, committed during said criminal episode, and
the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served con-
currently or consecutively."
The lesser included offense analysis, as exemplified by this stat-
ute, could have and should have been the basis for the Pinder deci-
sion. Unfortunately, the supreme court ignored a district court
case, Ennis v. State,6 in which a sentence for the underlying fel-
ony was vacated under a statutory lesser included offense analysis.
In Ennis, the defendant was convicted in a single trial of first
degree felony murder and robbery as well as conspiracy to commit
robbery. Ennis appealed, arguing that the robbery sentence was vi-
olative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment under
Brown and Harris.36 The district court disagreed that Brown and
Harris were applicable, correctly reasoning that those cases in-
volved successive prosecutions and not multiple punishments re-
31. The single transaction rule is illustrated by the court's decision in Cone v. State, 285
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973). In reversing the sentence of the defendant, who had been convicted
both of robbery and the separate crime of displaying or using a firearm during the robbery,
the supreme court said that since the two crimes were part of the same criminal transaction,
only one sentence could be imposed for the higher offense. Id. at 13.
32. See J. Hatchett & B. Norton, 1977 Developments in Criminal Law, 32 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1007, 1051-53 (1977) for a discussion of the difficulty encountered by the Florida courts
in applying the single transaction rule.
33. Ch. 76-66, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 115 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1979)).
34. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1979).
35. 364 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Todd v. State, 369 So. 2d 95
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), which reaches the same result.
36. 364 So. 2d at 498. The defendant also contended that his sentence for conspiracy to
commit robbery was excessive. The supreme court agreed because the indictment failed to
allege that Ennis conspired to carry a firearm during the robbery, which is an essential
element of robbery in the first degree. Id. at 500. See FLA. STAT. § 812.13(2)(a) (1979). The
court held that because the robbery was only a second degree felony, the conspiracy was
thus a third degree felony for which the maximum sentence is five years. 364 So. 2d at 500.
See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1979).
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sulting from a single prosecution. s The district court based its
holding on the Florida statute mentioned above that permits sepa-
rate sentences for violations of two statutes, excluding lesser in-
cluded offenses."' The Ennis court reasoned that the robbery was a
lesser included offense because the robbery was alleged in the
charging language of the murder count and was proven at trial.39
When Pinder was before the Second District Court of Appeal,
the district court stated that:
We think that these United States Supreme Court decisions
[Brown v. Ohio and Harris v. Oklahoma] require that where (as
here) the defendant is convicted of felony-murder, and there is no
evidence of premeditation other than the fact that the killing oc-
curred during the perpetration of the underlying felony, he can-
not also be convicted and sentenced for the underlying felony.'0
Although resting its decision on double jeopardy grounds, the dis-
trict court also claimed that sexual battery or burglary could not
be lesser included offenses of premeditated murder."1 The court
explained that the fact that the lesser offense is part of the greater
offense must not only be proved, but also must be alleged in the
charging documents. 2
In actuality, the lesser included offense analysis would be appro-
priate in Pinder to bar cumulative sentences. The Florida Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute to require that a category three
lesser included offense "be necessarily included in the major of-
fense charged by the accusatory pleading.' 4
Pinder was charged with premeditated murder and not felony
murder," so the district court ignored Ennis. Instead, the court
37. 364 So. 2d at 499.
38. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1979).
39. 364 So. 2d at 500.
40. 366 So. 2d at 41.
41. Id. at n.3.
42. Id.
43. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1968) (emphasis in original).
44. 366 So. 2d at 40. Pinder argued that since the indictment charged him with premedi-
tated murder, he was found guilty under the felony murder theory because no evidence of
premeditation existed. The state challenged Pinder's argument, using the following passage
from Pinder's own brief to support its claim that evidence of premeditation did exist:
Dr. Horn, a pathologist, testified that he went to Mary Baker's apartment on July
19 and found the unidentified corpse of an elderly lady lying face down. The
hands were bound, with the binding passing around the neck. The cause of death
was strangulation . . . .Dr. Horn found the manner in which the bindings had
been tied remarkable, effective, time consuming. Any pressure on the arms would
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conveniently applied case law which permits conviction under a
felony murder theory even though the defendant has been charged
with premeditated murder.'5 Consequently, despite the fact that
the true basis of Pinder's conviction is felony murder, the court
expediently reasoned that the lesser included offense analysis
could not be applied because of the technicality that Pinder was
charged with premeditated murder. The emphasis should not be
upon the technicality of the charging language, especially when the
jury is permitted to convict under another charge.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Whalen v.
United States certainly supports the assertion that the Florida Su-
preme Court should have vacated Pinder's sentence through the
lesser included offense analysis. In Whalen, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced in a single trial for a rape and a killing
committed during the rape.46 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the lower court erred in construing District of Columbia
statutes to allow. cumulative punishments. 7
The Whalen decision attempted to clarify the scope of double
jeopardy. According to the majority, the question of whether a
court's imposition of multiple punishments is a violation of double
jeopardy can only be resolved by first construing the appropriate
statute to determine what punishment the legislative branch au-
thorized. 4 Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the
court, but claimed that prior dicta of the Court wrongly suggested
that "the Double Jeopardy Clause may prevent the imposition of
cumulative punishments in situations in which the Legislative
Branch clearly intended that multiple penalties be imposed for a
single criminal transaction." ' 49 Thus, where a state statute clearly
allows such cumulative punishments, the Whalen majority decision
strangle the victim ....
Brief of Petitioner at 4, State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979) (quoting Brief of Appel-
lant at 8) (citations omitted). The state asserted that this was "gruesome and unbelievable
evidence of premeditation." Brief of Petitioner at 3-4. The supreme court evaluated the
record on its own and found no evidence of premeditation. 375 So. 2d at 839.
45. 366 So. 2d at 40. Both courts cited Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976), for
the proposition that established precedent allows the state to prosecute a first degree mur-
der charge under a felony murder theory although the indictment charges premeditated
murder. 375 So. 2d at 839; 366 So. 2d at 40.
46. 100 S. Ct. at 1434.
47. Id. at 1437.
48. 100 S. Ct. at 1436. The Court defined the scope of the double jeopardy clause by
stating that the clause "at the very least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive
sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so." Id.
49. Id. at 1441 (emphasis in original).
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does not prohibit the imposition of multiple punishments for a fel-
ony murder and the underlying felony.
Justice Blackmun also pointed to the unrepudiated dicta as the
source of confusion among the states and of their incorrect reliance
upon Harris, which involved successive prosecutions.5 0 In a foot-
note, Justice Blackmun bluntly criticizes Pinder and similar cases
from other states because they "erroneously I believe, gave control-
ling effect to Harris in challenges to cumulative punishments for
felony murder and the underlying felony."5 1 According to Black-
mun, Harris stands only for the proposition that it is "successive
prosecutions for felony murder and the underlying predicate fel-
ony [that] are constitutionally impermissible. ' '52
While the Supreme Court's decision in Whalen highlights some
important issues concerning the scope of double jeopardy protec-
tion, it also serves to eliminate any further confusion in Florida
about the appropriate rationale for prohibiting cumulative
sentences for a felony murder and the underlying felony. Clearly in
Florida, when a defendant is charged with felony murder, the
underlying felony is a lesser included offense, and cumulative sen-
tencing may not be imposed. It is just as clear that the Florida
Legislature did not intend that multiple penalties be imposed in a
felony murder case, because it specifically prohibited punishment
for lesser included offenses .5 The logic should be no different in a
case such as Pinder. Since Florida law allows a defendant to be
found guilty of felony murder when he is charged with premedi-
tated murder, the lesser included offense analysis is entirely appro-
priate. The well-reasoned approach that Florida courts should now
follow is obvious: the lesser included offense analysis should be ap-
plied to prevent the imposition of cumulative sentences for felony
murder and the underlying felony.
LESLEY J. FRIEDSAM
50. Id. In fact, Justice Blackmun cited Ennis v. State as a case in which the members of
the state court disagreed about the meaning of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
the prohibition of the double jeopardy clause against multiple punishments. Id. at n.2.
51. Id. at 1442 n.3. The other state cases are Mitchell v. State, 382 N.E.2d 932 (Ind.
1978); State v. Frye, 393 A.2d 1372 (Md. 1978); State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980); and Briggs v. State, 573 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.
1978).
52. Id. at 1441 (emphasis in original).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1979).
